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MANY SILENT WORLDS
MARTHA MINOW·

INTRODUCTION

Jay Katz's probing book, The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient 1
affords a close look at the secluded world of doctor-patient relation
ships. With sensitivity to both the political and psychological dimen
sions of power in those relationships, the book demonstrates how
doctors' control of information and decisionmaking for their patients
historically has served seemingly paradoxical human needs. On the
one hand, doctors have responded to patients' desires for care-and
yet on the other, they have abandoned patients by ignoring the whole
person and demanding passive surrender to their ministrations (pp.
207-09). Doctors have advanced their own desires for power, and doc
tors also have acted to deny the pain of their patients, and to avoid
confrontation with universal human powerlessness before severe
threats to health and life.
Jay Katz's exploration of the silent world of doctor and patient
made me wonder whether there are similar silent worlds bounded by
other relationships. Locating human relationships on a spectrum,
moving from the most intimate and daily toward the least familiar and
most discontinuous, I imagine we could place family relationships on
the first end, and relations between strangers on the other. Falling
somewhere in between would be relationships established and limited
by contract, including professional-client bonds. And standing be
yond these relations-but also shaping each of them-are the special
and unavoidable relationships between the state and the individual.
Does the search for conversations and shared decisionmaking between
doctors and patients, as advocated by Jay Katz, hold promise for peo
ple in these other kinds of relationships? I will speculate about these
other contexts, and close with a thought about the continuing
problems of silence.
• Professor of Law, Harvard University; A.B., University of Michigan, 1975;
Ed.M., Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1976; J.D., Yale Law School, 1979.
I. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
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A RANGE OF RELATIONSHIPS

Parents and Children

Analogies between the paternalism of doctors and the paternal
ism of parents are not difficult to draw. Combining the role of care
giver with the assumptions of knowledge and expertise, both doctors
and parents can, and often have, adopted a stance of "I know best"
with regard to those under their care. Like doctors, parents have long
enjoyed a presumption of acting in the interests of those they care for. 2
And yet this presumption increasingly has come under both factual
and philosophic challenge. 3 Statistics about child abuse and neglect,4
child abandonment, and parent/child conflict over issues such as teen
sexuality 5 challenge the assumption that parents and children always
share the same interests. If left unchallenged within legal doctrines
about families, the assumption that parents and children share inter
ests can disguise and perpetuate severe risks for many children. Ex
treme risks from unchecked parental power include the dangers of
child abuse, undue punishment for misbehavior, and exclusion from a
range of opportunities and experiences that the child might want or
need. 6 Short of these extreme risks, parental power may have devastat
ing effects on the child's formation of a sense of self.
Psychoanalyst Alice Miller explored some of these consequences
for the child whose parents, preoccupied with their own needs, de
2. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (Georgia statute providing for
voluntary admission of children under 18 to state hospitals with parental consent, did not
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
3. Nevada v. Bill_ and Muriel _, 91 Nev. 275, 534 P.2d 1264 (1975) (child aban
doned in garbage container). See also Miller & Miller, Protecting the Rights ofAbused and
Neglected Children, 19 TRIAL, June 1983, at 68.
4. From 1978 to 1982, the incidence of child abuse and neglect cases rose from 2.7
cases per 1000 to 4.0 cases per 1000. Statstics taken from an ongoing study entitled "Na
tional Study on Child Abuse and Neglect" funded by the American Humane Association
and the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect.
5. See Mnookin, Belotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN:
ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM AND PUBLIC POLICY 150, 155-60 (R. Mnookin, ed. 1985) (giv
ing statistics showing sharp increase in teen sexual activity and motherhood and discussing
teenagers' difficulties discussing sex with parents). This essay also provides a detailed case
study of the successful constitutional challenge to legislation requiring parental consent to
minors' abortions, and reveals the mixed legacy of Massachusetts' response of individual
ized judicial hearings to avoid parental consent.
6. Similarly, assumptions about mutuality of interests among family members can
shield from public or legal review risks and harms some family members pose to others.
Recent exposes about the abuse of spouses and of elderly relatives reveal other silent worlds
of misused power within the family. See, e.g., Eastman, Elders Under Seige, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Jan. 1984, at 30; O'Riely, Wife-Beating: The Silent Crime, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at
23.
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mand performance, excellence, and compliance but give little regard
for the child's individual and personal needs. 7 The child's desire to
please the parent may lead to the construction of a false self, accompa
nied by rejection and shame about the child's innermost feelings. 8 In
the name of guiding the child toward successful adulthood, the parent
may thus silence the child's own needs so powerfully that the child can
no longer acknowledge them. Alternatively, the child may grow de
pendent on the parent while the parent comes to enjoy and rely on that
dependence. This pattern could hamper the potential for growth for
both parent and child-and for their relationship over time.
Yet what are the alternatives? Within the family dynamic itself,
pretending that the parent is a "friend" of the child instead of a parent
could prove disastrous. Denying power differentials, and denying how
different roles and responsibilities shape the contours and identity of a
relationship, simply would preserve sources of silence and repression.
The doctor possesses what the patient does not: knowledge and exper
tise about medical treatment, and legal responsibility for medical ad
vice. So, too, does the parent have much that the child does not:
resources, knowledge about the world, and legal and moral responsi
bilities to care for the child. Rejecting the legal presumption that par
ents act in their children's interests could justify limitless state
investigations and involvement with families, especially given the
vague and controversial criteria for such governmental activities. 9
Jay Katz's work suggests that in the analogous situation of the
doctor and patient, disparities in power, knowledge, and role can mark
the beginning, not the end, of conversation. Perhaps parents and chil
dren, too, can engage in conversations about needs, desires, roles, and
obligations, at least once the child is able to communicate and reason.
Children do learn to say "no" quite early, \0 and in so doing challenge
parents to seek compliance through persuasion. Yet children learn
very quickly that the reason offered by a parent for refusing a child's
7.

8.
9.

A. MILLER, DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD (1981).
Id. at 49-58.
See Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest, 43 HARV. ED. REV. 158

(1973).
10. Indeed, it is this capacity that gives twenty-four-month-olds the label, "the terri
ble twos." See R. KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS IN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 83 (1982). The differentiation between self and others hinted at during this
stage along with subsequent cognitive developments assure that the child, as an independ
ent person, can ask for reasons and can choose to accept them. Id. at 83-110; J. KAGAN,
THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 112-53 (1984). See also Pines, Children's Winning Ways,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Dec. 1984, at 58 (some children are naturally skilled at silent per
suasion; their rewards are affection and power). See generally J. PIAGET, THE LANGUAGES
AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (1959).
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desire can acquire an independent life, and the child can cite the rea
son the next time around. This begins a conversation that may indeed
hold the parent accountable and put the parent to the test of persuad
ing the child. Is this a promising direction for family relations?
A commitment to conversation can hardly resolve the looming
problems of child abuse and neglect and similar consequences of un
checked parental power. Moreover, I would be wary of a legal rule
premised on a commitment to conversation between parent and child
given the backdrop risks of abusive exercise of parental power. A state
law requiring a pregnant adolescent to communicate with her parents
before seeking an abortion, for example, could subject the child to
abuse rather than promote trusting relations. 11 Perhaps the commit
ment to conversation demands a deeper look at the legal, social, and
economic settings in which parents and children relate. What would
laws governing families look like if designed to be conducive to trust
ing, communicative relations between parent and child, while still per
mitting external checks on abusive use of unequal power within the
relationship? I suspect that it is this kind of deeper inquiry that Jay
Katz points to in the context of doctors and patients as well.
Professor Katz's analysis interweaves historical evidence about
doctors' ideologies and political struggles with a study of the micro
politics of doctor-patient dynamics (pp. 30-47). With this textured
analysis, his inquiry into how doctors and patients together give mean
ing to authority, autonomy, and certainty in their shared interactions
yields a vivid sense of how power is constructed in relationships, and
how relationships have both social and psychological dimensions (pp.
85-90). The analysis reveals how conflict between patients and doctors
is inevitable, given their separateness. Not even doctors--or parents
who sincerely believe they work in another's interests avoid this con
flict (p. 100). Trusting relations, Professor Katz concludes, must build
on a recognition of potential conflict, inequalities of experience and
irrational as well as rational expectations between doctor and patient
(pp. 99-102).
By analogy, thoughtful inquiry into parent-child relationships
would also start by recognizing potential conflicts of interest, inequali
ties of strength and experience, and irrational as well as rational mo
tives that parents and children bring to their relationships. Trust
11. H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 438-39 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
Comment, Parent versus Child; H. L. v. Matheson and the New Abortion Litigation, 1982
WIS. L. REV. 75, 115 ("parental notification rights requirements present an unprecedented
interference in intra-family communication and relationships, and may have serious conse
quences to the physical and emotional health of pregnant teenagers").
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cannot be imposed or demanded. Instead, like doctors, parents need
to surrender their own power to shield abuses from view and make
themselves vulnerable by sharing their own uncertainties. 12 Yet to
whom should parents surrender their pretense of certainty? Not to
infants or very young children, although even in the case of very
young children, rather than hiding behind pretended certainty parents
could share doubts with other adults (neighbors, relatives, or friends),
with better consequences for the parent-child relationship.
B.

Professionals and Clients

A similar, deeper inquiry may be necessary to address the condi
tions of distrust between clients and professionals other than doctors.
Mounting numbers of malpractice suits against not only doctors, \3 but
also lawyers,14 accountants,15 and engineers l6 hint at the unsatisfac
tory qualities of communication and service within the ongoing rela
tionships between professional and client. Interestingly, malpractice
suits may express the failure of a solely contractual approach to the
law governing professional services. People bring to professional rela
tionships expectations and desires to invest their trust in someone with
expertise. Malpractice suits represent a collateral assault on those re
lationships when such expectations and desires are unfulfilled. Con
tractual boundaries on those relationships cannot contain such
expectations, especially when clients suffer injury at the hand, or by
the neglect, of their hired professional.
Malpractice suits often betray failures not just in the services pro
vided, but also in the communication in the course of the professional
relationships. Again, Jay Katz's insights about doctors and patients
suggest that the real work to be done in professional relationships
must take place long before a malpractice suit. The professionals must
learn to share information, critical facts, and analysis of risks with
12. Cf Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 933, 988-1009 (1985) (building trust in debates over medical treatment for
handicapped newborns should start with recognition of distrust and antagonism).
13. See Danzon, The Frequency and Severity ofMedical Malpractice Claims, 27 J.L.
& ECON. liS (1984). See generally Mechanic, Some Social Aspects ofthe Medical Malprac
tice Dilemma, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1179, 1183 (malpractice suits related to loss of trust).
14. See Gates, The Newest Data on Lawyers Malpractice Claims, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1984, at 79.
IS. See Collins, ProfeSSional Liability: The Situation Worsens, J. ACCT., Nov. 1985,
at 57.
16. According to a 1982 article, the incidence of claims against engineers per 100
insurance policies was 36.3/100 in 1978; 44.2/100 in 1979; and 45/100 in 1982. Berreby,
Architects After the Fall, NAT'L. L.J., July 19, 1982, at 31, col. 4.
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clients; clients must learn to demand such sharing. Professor Katz
may, however, underestimate the extent to which younger doctors
have already begun to communicate options to their patients, J7 but
doctors often still fail to build the bases for trust by neglecting to edu
cate patients to demand and then scrutinize critical medical judg
ments. The pressing question, then, is whether professionals can learn
to help equip their clients to become self-empowered, critical monitors
of professional power. What legal rules, aside from the crude tools of
malpractice law, would promote this process? These too are questions
that emerge if we draw on the insights of Jay Katz (pp. 46-47).
C.

Strangers and Strangers

Just as malpractice law has developed to express clients' disap
pointed expectations with professionals and professional service con
tracts, products liability law has communicated consumers' frustration
with defective products and with consumer contracts law. Breaking
away from the exchange of party expectations captured by contract
law, these tort theories shock defendants with the power of plaintiffs'
disappointments, and break the silence that might otherwise prevail
between strangers.
It may seem odd to include strangers at all in a discussion of in
terpersonal relationships. And yet it is possible to see a relationship
between the stranger who produces a defective tire and the stranger
who purchases it and suffers injury as a result. It is a relationship of
silence and distance. The impossibility of conversation in this context
may explain the development of strict liability rules over time,18 even
though this same impossibility, in earlier times, justified immunity for
the producer of the defective product. 19 Perhaps strict liability is the
better solution, not just the more humane one, because a strict liability
17. Interview with Dr. Robert Singer, family physician in the Boston area (Mar. 16,
1986).
18. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962)
(consumer's lack of knowledge of a product's defect which makes the product unsafe for its
intended use justifies recovery from the manufacturer if the consumer is injured while using
the product for its intended purpose); Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, III
N.E. 1050 (1916) (knowledge of a probable danger and of the fact that a product will be
used by people other than the buyer is enough to charge a manufacturer with a duty in
dependent of its contract). Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a)
(1977) (seller is liable for injuries attributable to product even if the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product).
19. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & w. 109 (ex. Ch. 1842) (lack ofpriv
ity, and therefore, communication between manufacturer and user justifies restricting a
cause of action for injuries only to those who entered into a contract regarding the
product).
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rule in effect breaks the silence. Strict liability communicates to the
producer the risk of injury to the buyer, and invites the producer to
internalize the needs of the buyer in advance of any injury. Jay Katz's
work, then, offers a way to think about even the rules governing rela
tionships between strangers as ways to break silence, bridge the gaps in
communication, and check previously unchecked power.

D. States and Individuals
There is one more set of relationships that may also be marked by
silence, power and dependency. Each individual has a continuing rela
tionship with the state, whether or not the individual ever breaks a law
or appears before a judge. Even in private dealings between individu
als, the state offers a continuing presence as the enforcer and protector
of individual rights and freedoms.20 Indeed, the reliance of individu
als, under our legal system, on rights enforced by the state, could be
understood as part of a pattern of dependency about which we remain
largely silent. And this silence may undermine the possibilities for re
alizing democracy in practice.
How could this be so? For rights to have meaning, they must
exist in their enforceability by the state, not only in individuals' sensi
bilities about their own entitlements. Yet this demand for enforceabil
ity makes the individuals dependent on the state, and on particular
state officials' willingness to recognize and give meaning to a given
asserted right in a particular factual context. It is also true, as with all
relationships of power, that this dependence works two ways. Unless
individuals seek legal enforcement of their rights, the state officials
have little occasion to exercise power. And the state's power, at least
ideally, is guided by the shape of the claims of rights individuals can
use to persuade state officials. Power, then, is the quality of the rela
tionships between people, not a quantitative item parceled out in some
dim, dark past.
Would it be possible for individuals to experience their rights not
as supplicants for state enforcement but as crafters of their own self
governance? Many political philosophers have speculated about this
issue. 21 I am most taken by those who make central to their specula
20. See Olsen, The Myth ofState Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
835, 836-42 (1985) (examining laws governing families by reinforcing parental or state
authority).
21. See, e.g., K. MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 31 (A. Jolin
& J. O'Malley trans. 1970) (state cannot govern for the good of all unless it is controlled by
all); J. S. MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 341-50 (Great Books ed. 1952) (1861)
(community governance--each citizen taking part in shaping and enforcing law-is the
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tions the individual's need for communal identity as part of the indi
vidual's political and civil rights. 22 Moving toward these speculations,
in practice, requires at least the initial step of speaking about our inter
dependence. We must, in turn, speak about the problems of founding
relationships between state and individual on the basis of unspoken
dependence. Again, Jay Katz's work provides an initial lexicon, a lan
guage to discuss what has not often been discussed: the patterns of
dependency, power, and silence within relationships.

II.

FINDING WORDS FOR SILENCE

The hope of finding words where there has been silence, then,
provides a direction for legal and nonlegal efforts to challenge abuses
of power. Yet this hope must be modulated by the sobering recogni
tion of complexity. Each person is simultaneously involved in more
than one relationship, and these involvements influence the construc
tion and experience of power. A woman's support in her intimate rela
tionships, for example, may strengthen her stance as a professional; or
it may instead contribute to deeper experiences of dependency.
Feelings of powerlessness may at times preclude speech, even
speech about powerlessness. In this context, I am reminded of a poem
so expressive of the difficulties in finding words that it conveys silence
even as it speaks.
The poet W. S. Merwin wrote this short, abrupt verse, entitled
"Elegy" :23
Who would I show it to
Ending with a preposition, in mid-thought; ending without punctua
tion, and relying on reference without definition; stand-in words like
"who," "I," and "it" for undisclosed references: the poem is perplexideal form of government; best way for individuals to enjoy rights is to stand up for them);
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, BOOKS II, III, IV (T. Nugent trans. Great Books
ed. 1952) (1748) (comparing government by law rather than despotism, and commending
education for a democracy that imbues love of law); J. J. ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT,
BOOK III 411-12 (G. Cole trans. Great Books ed. 1952) (1792) (true democracy is impossi
ble because people cannot remain assembled to govern their affairs and it is best to have the
wisest govern).
22. See H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, (1958); J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON
DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A TRANSITION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1983); M. SANDEL, LIB
ERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Wolin, Revolutinary Action Today, in POST
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 244 (J. Rajchman & C. West eds. 1985).
23. w. S. MERWIN, "Elegy," in THE CARRIER OF LADDERS: POEMS BY W. S. MER
WIN 137 (1978).
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ing.24 Incompletion and dependence on what remains forever unsaid
weigh heavily in the poem, and at least in some measure, may be its
message. Yet, probing for some more specific meaning, the reader
could try to relate to the text and draw from the reader's own experi
ence. "Why such incompletion?" the reader can ask. What could be
the "it" in the poem-perhaps the elegy in the title. The "I"-per
haps the poet. The "who"-perhaps no one known, no one alive. Per
haps the poem means the poet's relationship with someone has been so
interrupted, so cut off, perhaps by death, that the very idea of memori
alizing the lost one seems futile. The one person who could under
stand and appreciate the poet's efforts to write an elegy is gone. The
possibility of mourning that could reach closure is so dim that the poet
cannot even complete the thought about how to try.
And yet, if any of this discussion echoes the meanings the author
intended or meanings sensed by readers other than me, another twist
in the meaning remains. If I am able to grasp some portion of the
poet's thought and feeling, some sense of how great would be the
poet's grief, loss, and interruption that produces such a statement of
the impossibility of statement, then indeed the poet has communi
cated. And the silence, between strangers, between author and reader,
has indeed been broken. Conversation where there has been silence
may best begin this way, in expressions of what has been and perhaps
remains inexpressible. Our ability to say just that may help us share,
and therefore, transform our silent worlds.

24.

My understanding of the poem has been enhanced by R.
37-40 (1982).
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